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ABSTRACT
This article examines policy capacity for dealing with the eﬀects of
climate change. The case under study is the Delta Program in the
Netherlands; a large-scale policy program to prepare the country for
current and anticipated eﬀects of climate change that runs until
2050. Using a qualitative case study approach, we examine how the
actors involved design analytical capacity, operational capacity and
political capacity to deal with the uncertainty and complexity that are
inherent in this policy ﬁeld. The context of climate change necessi-
tates policy capacity that anticipates eﬀects that are in themselves
uncertain and ambiguous, span over decades of time, and involve
many stakeholders. Our analysis shows how policy capacity was
designed to allow for present-day interventions, while also enabling
adaptation to new and emerging developments overtime. We con-
clude our article with theoretical and practical lessons about policy
capacity for dealing with long-term uncertainty and complexity.
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Introduction
This special issue focuses on the capacity to anticipate what could happen during the
process of policy implementation and pre-address it through policy design that is
‘prepared’ for it (Poli, 2017). In this vein, anticipating policy success means designing
policies in a way that makes positive policy feedback more likely than negative policy
feedback. Policy eﬀectiveness can never be entirely predicted, but policymakers can take
steps to enhance their chances of success.
In this article, we examine a design process that attempts to anticipate policy success for
an issue that is highly complex, has a very long time-horizon and encompasses interven-
tions and instruments with a long lead time; dealing with the eﬀects of climate change. These
conditions greatly complicate the eﬀort to anticipate; complexity and non-linear dynamics
make it impossible to foresee all of the possible futures of the issue; the long time-horizon
enhances the space for complexity and widens the range of possible outcomes; the long lead
time of possible interventions presses the policymaker for time, since in order to ‘pre-
address’ a development of the design process needs to start early. This set of conditions
makes it impossible to entirely pre-address potential policy dynamics, simply because they
cannot be foreseen.
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The impossibility of foreseeing dynamics makes climate adaptation policy a suitable
case to study anticipatory policy design; even though the actual eﬀectiveness of the
policy remains to be seen. Examining how policymakers anticipate policy success in
spite of all the ambiguity and complexity of the issue may enrich our understanding of
long-term design processes and their characteristics, in extreme as well as less extreme
policy domains. The following research question guides our study:
What are the design characteristics of policy capacity building for anticipating future
eﬀectiveness amidst deep uncertainty?
The remainder of our article is structured as follows. First, we build a framework for
analyzing policy capacity by tailoring an existing framework to the context of ‘anticipa-
tion under deep uncertainty’. Second, we study the case of climate change adaptation
policy in the Netherlands. We examine and discuss the diﬀerent elements of policy
capacity in the case. Finally, we critically discuss what this case teaches us about
anticipation of policy success under conditions of deep uncertainty.
Theoretical framework
Policy capacity
Dealing with climate change requires policy capacity. Wu, Ramesh &Howlett (2015, p. 166)
deﬁne policy capacity as ‘the set of skills and resources – or competencies and capabilities –
necessary to perform policy functions’. They distinguish three necessary types of capacity;
analytical, operational and political capacity, applying to three levels; the individual, orga-
nizational and systematic level (see Table 1).
Policy capacity is ‘what results from the combinations of skills and resources at each
level’ (Wu et al., 2015, p. 168), while the interplay between diﬀerent competencies helps
to better understand cases of policy failure or success. According to the authors,
studying the interplay in concrete cases can add to our insights about the design of
eﬀective policy capacity. In this article, we use this framework of policy capacity to
analyze the process and design choices made in the case of climate adaptation policy in
the Netherlands. However, before we do that it is important to align the framework to
the speciﬁc set of complicating factors for anticipating success in the context of climate
adaptation policy. We will discuss these factors here.
Complicating factors for anticipating policy success
As a policy problem, handling the eﬀects of climate change is complex (Biesbroek et al.,
2010; Bloemen, Reeder, Zevenbergen, Rijke, & Kingsborough, 2017; Peters, 2017;
Table 1. Levels and competencies of policy capacity.
Competency
Level Analytical Operational Political
Individual Individual analytical capacity Individual operational capacity Individual political capacity
Organizational Organizational analytical
capacity
Organizational operational
capacity
Organizational political
capacity
Systemic Systemic analytical capacity Systemic operational capacity Systemic political capacity
2 P. BLOEMEN ET AL.
Teisman, Van Buuren, & Gerrits, 2009; Van Der Steen, Vink, Chin-A-Fat, & Van Twist,
2016); the problem involves many actors and factors that interact and, therefore,
produce non-linear dynamics in the system (Head & Alford, 2015). Overtime, many
interactions and non-linear dynamics may render it impossible to oversee or predict
future conditions. Walker et al. (2010) refer to this condition as deep uncertainty. In
situations of deep uncertainty, experts and stakeholders cannot agree upon (i) the
external context of the system, (ii) how the system works and its boundaries and (iii)
the outcomes of interest from the system and/or their relative importance .
Deep uncertainty is problematic for anticipating policy eﬀectiveness because it causes
what Lindblom (1979) refers to as policy myopia (Nair & Howlett, 2017). In the case of
policy myopia, a policymaker cannot foresee the eﬀects and conditions of policy into
the future, not because of ‘bounded rationality’ (Simon, 1997 [1945]) or a lack of
information, but because it is inherently impossible. In the same vein, authors distin-
guish between ‘informational uncertainty’ and ‘ambiguity’ (March & Olsen, 1989;
Weick, 2000). Policy capacity for dealing with the eﬀects of climate change involves
dealing with the inherent ambiguity that results from the combination of complexity
and time (see also Van Der Wal, 2017).
Indeed, in the case of climate change, policymakers have to discount eﬀects that are
spread out over a long time-line (Peters, 2017; Hulme, 2009). Action in the present is
needed to avert harm in the future, requiring policymakers to somehow take the future
into account when planning contemporary solutions. However, there is little agreement
on the best measures and instruments that policymakers can fall back on (Capano &
Woo, 2017; Howlett & Ramesh, 2014).
Moreover, policymakers will also be pressed for time. They will have to come to a
solution ‘in time’. However, what that means is dependent on the time it takes to build
responses (Peters, 2017). As interventions to prepare for climate change have a long
lead time – they take years or even decades to be designed, planned and build –
policymakers cannot aﬀord to wait too long; they need information that informs
them of imminent challenges early.
Insights from climate adaptation policy
These complicating elements of climate change policy have been translated into a variety
of frameworks for policy capacity. Such frameworks combine elements of anticipatory
and adaptive capacity; they take into account existing knowledge and deliberately plan
capacity to be adaptive along the way (Walker et al., 2010, Bloemen et al., 2017; Buurman
& Babovic, 2016; Howlett & Mukherjee, 2014; Haasnoot, Kwakkel, Walker, & Ter Maat,
2013; Haasnoot, Middelkoop, Oﬀermans, Beek, & Deursen, 2012; Walker, Haasnoot, &
Kwakkel, 2013).
In climate adaptation policy, the term adaptation is used in two diﬀerent ways. In the
context of climate change, it refers to measures that prepare for the consequences of a
changing climate; eg the heightening of sea dikes in response to sea level rise. The
alternative use of the term refers to an adjustment of a plan following insights that emerge
along the way; eg the adjustment of a plan for an initially modest expansion of an airport in
order to accommodate a much sharper increase in demand. In this article, we use the term
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‘climate adaptation’ for measures that address eﬀects of climate change. For the act of
adjustment of a plan to accommodate new insights, we use the term ‘adaptation’.
A similar issue concerns the use of the adjective ‘adaptive’. It is often used as the
opposite of ‘transformational’, in which case adaptive resembles ‘incremental’. In the
alternative use the term indicates that a plan is not based on static conditions, but
explicitly takes unpredictable developments into consideration. Walker et al. (2010)
describe adaptive policies as a combination of taking steps towards an intended goal,
combined with the build-in ability to deviate from those same steps if necessary. We use
this latter deﬁnition; adaptiveness refers to the deliberate ‘act’ to design a system that
takes unpredictability as given.
In the ﬁeld of climate adaptation policy and research, diﬀerent types of approaches for
dealing with policy myopia have evolved (Vink et al., 2013a; Petersen & Bloemen, 2014;
Mees et al., 2012; Warner, 2008; Botzen & Van den Bergh, 2008). For long, policymakers
developed static ‘optimal’ plans based on a ‘most likely’ future generated from trend-
extrapolation. Or they produced ‘static robust’ plans that work favorably for ‘the most
plausible future worlds’ (Haasnoot et al., 2013: p. 485; Koningsveld, 2008). However,
static robust approaches rely heavily on the ability to predict future dynamics with some
level of accuracy. Therefore, policymakers looked for more ‘adaptive strategies’ that rely
less on prediction and more on the ability to respond to dynamics that emerge (Maier
et al., 2016:55; Beh et al., 2015; Groves et al., 2014; Haasnoot et al., 2013; 2014; Hamarat
et al., 2014; Swanson & Bhadwal, 2009; Lempert and Groves, 2010). In short, two
fundamentally diﬀerent approaches have emerged to policy design under conditions of
deep uncertainty:
(1) Static robust approaches; policy design involves choosing a ﬁxed time horizon (eg
2050) and deﬁning a set of measures that prepare for speciﬁc future conditions.
It is assumed the strategy will be implemented as designed and no adjustment
along the way will be necessary.
(2) Adaptive approaches; policy design involves choosing short-term measures (eg heigh-
tening sea dikes) and a set of monitoring criteria for keeping track of developments
that might require increasing or decreasing eﬀorts (eg acceleration in sea level rise). It
is assumed external conditions will change and require policy adjustments.
From here, many approaches for dealing with deep uncertainty of climate change
have developed; some accentuate robustness of plans and focus on eliminating factors
that can make the plan fail (eg Info-Gap Decision Theory, Robust Decision Making,
Decision Scaling); others accentuate adaptiveness and aim toward timely adjustments of
the plan. The Dynamic Adaptive Policy Pathways (DAPP) is an example of the latter;
DAPP consists of an overview of alternative routes into the future, called ‘adaptation
pathways’ (Haasnoot et al., 2013).
Adaptive approaches start from the notion that complex dynamics will inevitable
turn out diﬀerently than can be expected beforehand (Walker et al., 2010). Therefore,
anticipation of eﬀective policy relies on the pre-designed ability to deal with changing
conditions or sudden shocks (eg Walker et al., 2013; Walker et al., 2010). That puts a
strong focus on information to signal changing system dynamics, instead of information
that predicts possible routes into the future. To do so, adaptive approaches often work
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with ‘triggers’; a trigger is a signal that ‘potentially aﬀects obligations to integrity’ of the
system (Sowell, in press, p.19).
Triggers can be reactive in nature (‘stochastic triggers’) and proactive (‘periodic
triggers’) (Hart, 1994). Periodic triggers are clock-driven; for instance, to review ﬂood
protection standards every 12 years. Stochastic triggers are ‘the direct product of active,
continuous monitoring of a system for events that may impact the integrity of system’
(Sowell, in press: 19); they are reactive. Sometimes, stochastic triggers are directly
related to adaptation pathways (Haasnoot et al., 2013).
Because of the role of information, an adaptive approach requires a process for
monitoring the main policy challenge overtime. However, that is not the case for all
deep uncertainty themes; some are process-dominated, others more event-dominated. In
process-dominated themes the driving force can be discerned as a pattern. Examples are
the introduction of self-steering cars; the number of cars can be monitored overtime
and disruption is to some extend visible. In event-dominated themes there are no
timelines indicating an increase or decrease of the challenge; rare, individual events
drive the dynamics in the system; eg large earthquakes or tsunamis.
For process-dominated themes, both types of approaches (static robust and adaptive)
can be applied. Because event-dominated themes can only be ‘seen’ in sudden out-
bursts, a static robust approach is likely to be more eﬀective than an adaptive approach.
Table 2 provides a tentative categorization (Bloemen, in press).
The practice of working with adaptive climate change policies shows that organiza-
tional aspects play a major role in the willingness and ability to apply adaptation. In the
case of an adaptive approach, for example, the bureaucratic apparatus needs to be
prepared to execute the resulting adaptive policy recommendations. McCray, Oye, and
Petersen (2010) indicate that an adaptive approach requires an operational, bureau-
cratic apparatus that is geared to the process of adjusting strategies and plans (‘planned
adaptation’). In order to avert from path-dependency, resources and processes need to
be in place to act on new knowledge.
Policy capacity to anticipate success amidst uncertainty
In this article, we aim to produce novel insights about policy capacity that is designed to
deal with an uncertain future by analyzing the Dutch Delta Program. To build our
framework for analysis, we now link the diﬀerent approaches for dealing with deep
uncertainty developed in the ﬁeld of climate adaptation research to the interplays
between the competencies of policy capacity (Wu et al., 2015).
Table 2. Application of approaches to issues of deep uncertainty (Bloemen, forthcoming).
Type of approach
Process-dominated
themes
Event-dominated
themes
Static robust approaches
(Robust Decision Making, Decision Scaling, Info Gap Decision
Theory)
++ +++
Adaptive approaches
(Dynamic Adaptive Planning, Dynamic Adaptive Policy
Pathways)
+++ +
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Analytical ⇔ operational
Adaptive strategies for dealing with deep uncertainty require information about chan-
ging patterns in the system. Information can be collected ad hoc, but a system of
triggers and properly allocated and funded research capacity seems necessary. This
includes a system of relations between knowledge and policy-making processes, in
order to avert the risk of path-dependency or lock-in in bureaucratic procedures.
Political ⇔ analytical
Adaptation suggests that policy is adapted along the way, by means of information
about changing patterns in the system. Therefore, political decision-making should to
some extend be ‘information-based’ or even ‘evidence-based’. There should be a
tolerance for knowledge in political decision-making, instead of ‘fact free politics’.
Ideally, there is some level of agreement among political decision-makers about the
range of facts and information resources that underpin political debates (Vink, Dewulf
et al., 2013b).
Operational ⇔ political
In order to systematically adapt and reconsider policy, procedures and protocols have
to be in place for political debate about policy changes. In addition, such debate
requires an attitude and a political culture in which policy adaptation is seen as success
rather than failure; policy proceeds ‘as planned’ when it is adapted. This does not
happen ‘naturally’, but probably requires operational capacity to prioritize and facilitate
political decision on adaptation of policy.
Next, we examine the genesis, formulation and implementation of climate adaptation
policy in the Netherlands to draw lessons for the design of policy capacity for an
uncertain future. We will examine two issues in particular; (1) the central approach to
the process of climate adaptation and (2) the key policy capacities employed by the lead
actors for anticipating the eﬀectiveness of this approach. Examining these two issues
helps us to answer our central research question.
Case study: the Dutch Delta Program
Background
In 1953, a disastrous ﬂood struck the Netherlands with catastrophic consequences: 1836
people drowned, 47,000 homes and 500 km of dykes were destroyed, and many acres of
fertile agriculture land were ruined by salt water. The damage amounted to 10% of
GDP. To prevent such a future disaster, the ﬁrst Delta Commission came up with a
master plan. They designed what became known as ‘The Delta Works’; a comprehen-
sive and iconic set of waterworks, dykes and coastal protection works to manage the
water and protect the land against storm surges.
However, from the early 2000s, new challenges for water governance emerged. There was a
serious backlog in the maintenance of the levees. Soil subsidence and climate change were
recognized as important long-term challenges. Although the every-day risk of ﬂooding was
largely under control, new threats challenged the notion of control. Many actors in the ﬁeld of
water management shared the idea that ‘something should be done’, with stakeholders
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discussing the need for ‘a new water vision’ and ‘a regeneration of water management in The
Netherlands’, but there was little consensus about speciﬁc actions (Van Alphen, 2016).
Debate accelerated in 2005, when hurricane Katrina ﬂooded New Orleans. A critical
review of ﬂooding risks also renewed attention for the subpar conditions of some of the
existing water works. In addition, experts called for a new and updated set of standards
for water works. These standards were based on the size of the population and value of
investments in the early 60s and did not take possible eﬀects of climate change into
account. (Schultz Van Haegen & Wieriks, 2015).
The call for a second delta commission
These internal reﬂections coincided with questions from the Ministry of Finance about
the budget for water works, and the Dutch Senate passed a resolution urging the
government to come up with a long-term strategic plan in relation to the changing
climate (Van Twist, Schulz, Van Der Steen, & Ferket, 2013). In response to the Senate
motion, the national program Climate Adaptation and Spatial Planning (ARK) was set-
up. Uniting the four levels of government and the knowledge institutes on that subject,
the ARK Programme, produced the ﬁrst Dutch National Adaptation Strategy (NAS).
The ﬁnal draft was discussed and approved by the cabinet of ministers 2007. In the NAS
ﬂood safety was identiﬁed as one of themost pressing of four issues that had to be addressed.1
The combination of the attention for climate change labeled dramatic events abroad, and the
processes set-up by the ARK Programme for drafting the NAS of the Netherlands, further
increased the public and political attention to the issue of climate adaptation (Vink,
Boezeman, et al., 2013a).
Attempts to use the preparatory negotiations for the new national government (early
2007) to claim a budget of € 500 million for adaptation measures, as part of the €20 billion
proposal for a National Spatial Investment Agenda,2 had failed. The proposal was never
oﬃcially formalized and did not make it to the negotiation table. Therefore, this ‘execution-
pillar under the ARK Programme’ never saw the light. A strong lobby for building a large
research program, consisting of researchers and policymakers involved in the ARK
Programme, was more successful. The Knowledge for Climate Programme was granted a
budget of €50 million under the condition that the same amount of ﬁnancing would be
made available by the users of the knowledge that would be developed. That condition was
fulﬁlled. The ‘research-pillar under the ARK Programme’ outlived the ARK programme
and successfully produced relevant insights in the period 2008–2014.
Developing a constituency for change might be a pre-condition for political commit-
ment – but does not automatically lead up to it. The constituency for change was
growing but a substantial political commitment to founding a major climate adaptation
program apparently required more than that. The grand politically mobilizing perspec-
tive was still missing. The initiative for generating that perspective would not come
from the department of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment that had the lead
1The other three were: living conditions (heat stress and cloudbursts), biodiversity (shifts in ecosystems, salinization)
and economy (vulnerability of vital infrastructure; transport, energy, communication).
2Ruimtelijke Investeringsagenda (RIA).
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in the climate adaptation dossier with the ARK Programme producing the NAS, but
from the ‘competing’ department of Transport, Public Works and Watermanagement.
Subsequently, the newly formed cabinet Balkenende IV called for more attention to
the Dutch ﬂood safety. To instigate that discussion, the Ministry of Transport, Public
Works and Water Management published its new ‘Water Vision’ (Cabinet Balkenende,
2007), laying the foundation for a new Delta Commission, and translating the vision into
a request for advice on the expected increase in sea-level rise, and in the discharge of the
large Dutch rivers and other climatic and social developments from 2100 to 2200
considered important for the Dutch coastline, their implications and a concurrent
strategy for the sustainable development of the Dutch coast3:
This assignment gave the Commission an interventionist character. However, the
rather constrained assignment appeared problematic to the Commission. Therefore, it
decided to redeﬁne its assignment, for four reasons in particular:
(1) The time horizon of 2200 was exceptionally long and the Commission feared
that the long horizon would limit societal and political urgency for the required
investments (in addition to making it hard to come up with sensible claims amid
so much future uncertainty).
(2) Analysis showed that most of the climate change related problems would not
emerge on the coastline but along the rivers. Accordingly, the Commission
extended its geographical scope.
(3) The Commission wanted to move away from the crisis-prevention frame implied
by the original assignment and reframed its assignment accordingly into an
adaptation frame.
(4) The Commission redeﬁned its scope to the safeguarding of the future prosperity
of the Netherlands in view of climate change, and with that took a more
economic and social approach to the issue (see also: Boezeman, Vink, & Leroy,
2013), hesitant to position itself as a mere ‘Climate Commission’.
Research and dialogue about contested facts and priorities
The Commission wanted to ground its work in ‘state of the art’ climate research.
Therefore, the Commission consulted a broad range of climate experts and asked the
Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute (KNMI) to apply the scenarios of the eﬀects
of climate change to the speciﬁc situation in the Netherlands, and to calculate addi-
tional scenarios that deviated from the commonly used IPCC-scenarios (see also:
Vellinga, Katsman, Sterl, & Beersma, 2008). In addition, the Commission combined
climate change scenarios with economic and societal scenarios about the consequences
for the ‘earning capacity’ of the Dutch Delta.
Parallel to the Commission work and dialogue with key societal actors (see also:
Boezeman et al., 2013), senior policy managers at the Ministry of Transport, Public
Works and Water Management started to prepare the ground for a ‘safe landing’ of the
Commission’s proposals. This was an interesting move, as the Commission had not yet
3Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management (2007). Regulation Commission Sustainable Coastal
Development. 7 September 2007.
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taken any formal position. It may explain why some common bureaucratic competency
challenges were mitigated in the early stages of the policy process.
Lastly, the Ministry organized a series of ‘free-thinking dialogues’, allowing govern-
ment oﬃcials, water boards, civil servants, the secretariat and members of the
Commission, and private engineering ﬁrms to discuss potential conclusions of the
report. Actors participated on the basis of conﬁdentiality. The Commission was
informed of the sessions but had no formal relationship with them.
Institutionalization as part of the commission’s recommendations
In September 2008, the second Delta Commission published its ﬁnal report, issuing
ﬁerce warnings about climate change being a real threat to the Dutch economy (Delta
Commission, 2008c); but also of a plan to go forward (Delta Commission, 2008d; Vink
et al., 2013a; Boezeman et al., 2013). Because the Commission feared that attention
would quickly fade away, it proposed substantial institutional changes in Dutch water
governance (Delta Commission, 2008a). They recommended setting up a Delta
Program managed by a Delta Director, ﬁnanced by a Delta fund, all backed up by a
speciﬁc Delta Act. A leaked memo from the Commission revealed speak about the Delta
Director as a ‘Delta Dictator’, someone positioned in between the Minister and the
Cabinet, and the bureaucracy (Delta Commission, 2008b).
All of these institutional proposals intended to do the same thing; move the Delta
program away from every-day political and administrative battles over short-term
interests and ﬁnancial resources. This way, the Commission not only succeeded in
communicating the content of the issue, but also in building a coalition of interests and
the political clout to support it. It also proposed an institutional arrangement to
safeguard its recommendations way beyond the initial momentum.
Almost all key stakeholders adopted the proposals of the Commission, and despite
the unfolding global economic crisis, Parliament accorded the institutional proposals,
the Delta Act and the fund, providing a structural, substantial and depoliticized stream
of funding: ‘A solid Delta fund will be set up, which will make a fast implementation of
the Delta Program possible through a structural money ﬂow of at least € 1 billion
annually from 2020’ (Ministry of General Aﬀairs, 2009). The act would also back up
the Delta Director as a central coordinator located above all administrative parties. This
institutional position for a long-term issue that is existential for the Netherlands was a
novelty in the Dutch governmental landscape.
Policy design: choices and implementation
Decentralized design spaces within centralized parameters
Strategies for ﬂood safety, freshwater supply and spatial adaptation needed to be
designed in a way that would reduce the chance of both under- and overspending.
To that end, capacity to adapt was deliberately built in the policy design. These
strategies had to be a regional elaboration of stable overarching decisions, focusing
on 2050, while keeping possible conditions in 2100 in mind. These overarching Delta
decisions. Regional strategies were deﬁned as a coherent set of goals, measures and
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indicative planning, the measures of which were combined in cohesive Delta plans
(Delta Commissioner, 2014).
Program teams of policymakers from ministries, water boards, municipalities, pro-
vinces and often also societal partners developed the regional strategies. An overly
narrow and centralized approach for dealing with uncertainties across regions would
contribute to consistency, but it would also hurt the ability for local tailoring and
regional buy-in. That is where Adaptive Delta Management came in. This approach
allowed maximal design-space within the boundaries of the principles of the Delta
Program. It was developed iteratively while regional strategies were developed. The
inclusion of the diﬀerent levels of government and societal stakeholders helped to
mobilize support and overcome the paralyzing eﬀect of large uncertainties and politi-
cized discussions.
Parallel pathways of adaptation and long-term options
Adaptive Delta Management (ADM) was founded on the core values of the Delta
Program, solidarity, ﬂexibility and sustainability (Slob and Bloemen, 2014) and used
elements of the Dynamic Adaptive Policy Pathways approach (Haasnoot et al., 2013,
2012). This approach became the default option for dealing with long-term uncertainty
and strategy (Jeuken and Reeder, 2011).
ADM follows an adaptive and integrated approach, also referred to as ‘adaptive-by-
design’. Here, adaptive refers to the capacity to speed up or temporize the implementa-
tion of measures or switch to a diﬀerent strategy altogether, if developments so dictate
(Dessai & Van der Sluijs, 2007; Van Buuren et al., 2013). The four key features of ADM
are connecting short-term decisions with long-term objectives, developing adaptation
pathways, looking for and ‘rating’ ﬂexibility and linking measures with other invest-
ment agenda’s (eg ageing infrastructure, urban development, nature, shipping and
recreation) (Delta Program Commissioner, 2013).
As part of the adaptation pathways also more drastic interventions were identiﬁed
that might be necessary in second half of the century. An example is the option to
replace the open storm surge barrier in Rotterdam with a dam with sea sluices.
Delegated decision-making with a strong process czar
Eﬀective policy design also requires coherent decision-making. The Delta Commissioner
plays a central role in the decision-making process in the Delta Program. A politically
neutral yet seasoned former Permanent Secretary at the Prime Minister’s department
was appointed to the position. He is not a direct stakeholder in the process of climate
adaptation; his primary tasks are to keep the process going; connect national, regional
and local level stakeholders; safeguard the link between the long and the short term; and
align water management with spatial planning.
The Consultation Organization of Infrastructure and Environment (OIM) that repre-
sents all stakeholder organizations, ranging from recreation and shipping, to agriculture
and nature, presents decision proposals for discussion and ﬁne tuning to the National
Steering Group. Both the advice of the OIM and the conclusions of the National
Steering Group are published online. This transparency builds trust and contributes
to the decision-making capacity of the program.
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The a priori agreement on the decision-making structure also adds to the decision-
making capacity in and around the Delta Program. The Delta decisions constitute the
overarching frame. Simultaneously and iteratively with formulating these decisions,
regional strategies are developed to ensure alignment between the Delta Decisions
and regional and local conditions. The most concrete decisions take place at the level
of the Delta plans with the actual measures: dikes to be strengthened, river by-passes to
be constructed, measures for improving freshwater availability and so forth. Future
adjustments of decisions at these diﬀerent levels move alongside new research informa-
tion and new technology that will continuously become available.
Joint fact ﬁnding
Another approach applied in the Delta Program to increase decision-making capacity is
Joint Fact Finding. Whenever participants in the decision-making process feel that their
views are diverging they can be asked to jointly formulate a research question that will
deliver more information on the matter. This provides a strong and shared base of
information for the discussion, while it also helps to build a mutual understanding and
trust necessary to overcome diﬀerences and reach an agreement.
A key ambition of the Delta Program was to come up with integrated solutions. This
ambition implies that regional and local stakeholders commit themselves to adjust (in
location, design or timing) measures originally primarily focusing on ﬂood-safety,
freshwater supply and spatial adaptation, so that they also contribute to nature, recrea-
tion, quality of the rural or urban landscape, or to the overall regional economy. This
commitment contributes to the decision-making capacity in the Delta Program.
Formal policy evaluation in 2016
In the summer of 2016, an independent evaluation commission (Bureau for the Senior
Civil Service (ABD), Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 2016) concluded
that the Delta Act, the Delta Program and the Delta Commissioner were functioning
well and were working toward their ambitions. The Delta Act provides a solid legislative
infrastructure. The short-term measures have been decided on, and there is build-in
adaptation space for adjustment on the way to 2050 and 2100. The Delta Program
combines a given structure for policy design with an adaptive approach to design and
re-design. Every year, by a check it is assessed whether the strategies and plans are still
on track, and every six years a more fundamental review of the Delta decisions,
preferred regional strategies and Delta plans is carried out. These are all build-in
defaults; while they do not guarantee adaptivity, they do enhance the likelihood of
policy change in accordance with emerging developments and policy feedback.
However, the evaluation also raised concerns; the urgency about climate adaptation
was fading away (exactly as initially expected); a feeling of comfort and control had
nested in the diﬀerent agencies, with internal debates about making available scarce
resources for water works that ‘solve’ problems that may never happen. The evaluation
Commission sends out a clear message to all stakeholders; a long-term issue requires a
long-term commitment and a sustained level of attention rather than a periodic peak
and subsequent drop in attention and action.
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Discussion: lessons for policy capacity building
Here, we reﬂect on the process of the policy design in the case, using our conceptual
framework to explain what our case ﬁndings mean for the theory and practice of policy
capacity and policy design.
Analytical ⇔ operational capacity
The Delta Program organized its adaptive capacity in several ways. First of all, adapta-
tion pathways (Haasnoot et al., 2013) were developed and adopted as the cornerstones
for the Delta Decisions and for regional Delta strategies. These pathways are visualiza-
tions of how diﬀerent sequences of measures match with diﬀerent future conditions.
Agreeing ‘up-front’ on the set of preferable pathways provides a strong foundation for
future adjustments of plans and contributes to the adaptive capacity of the ‘Delta
Community’ as a whole. The pathways provided a long-term road-map for adaptation;
they became the starting-point for planning.
The same goes for the analytical concept of multilevel safety (MLS). Flood safety is
managed on diﬀerent levels. The ﬁrst is that of building and raising levees to hold the
water back. However, the Delta Program wanted to raise attention for the option of
improving the capacity to absorb water, for instance by ﬂood-prooﬁng buildings and
infrastructure (‘the second level’). Moreover, there is also the option of investing in
improving crisis management and evacuation (‘the third level’). These options were
always theoretically on the table, but the Delta Program made them the framework for
policy-making and for policy discussions. The Program consistently works from the
idea that strategies should not simply focus on level 1, but dramatically enhance the
capacity for level 2; moving along with the water, to relieve the pressure on level 1
capacity to hold the water back. Moreover, investment in level 3 is also part of the
policy package. That is of huge symbolic importance; because it institutionalizes the
option that ﬂooding can happen. For some areas, raising levees is a good option; for
other areas it is better to increase the ability to ‘absorb’ water, while for other areas
periodic evacuation is probably the best option.
Lesson 1: adaptiveness requires information conﬁrming that policy change is imminent
Therefore, a monitoring system was developed to actively look at long-term develop-
ments and emerging issues (Delta Program commissioner, 2016). The system detects
weak signals and marks signposts for possible policy change. The mere fact that the
system is in place means that there is information about the dynamics in the system is
being produced and that the policy-design is continuously tested, debated, and if
necessary redesigned. The availability of a steady ﬂow of data and information about
emerging issues ‘pushes’ the dynamics of the policy process into more attention for
adaptation.
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Political ⇔ analytical capacity
Lesson 2: feed the political debate and decision-making with evidence
The Delta Program has invested heavily in nesting the political debates and decision-
making in ‘joint-fact ﬁnding’. In every step of the process the Delta Program has promoted
among all government levels involved and all stakeholders to work from scientiﬁc evidence.
Lesson 3: political ‘calculation’ that favors ‘toggling’ between cycles
The Delta Program has to discount for interests over a very long time-line; in deciding on
investing in new projects costs and beneﬁts for diﬀerent generations of stakeholders need to
be taken into account. The Delta Program has given this an explicit place in the instruments
for deciding on projects. That can mean that future projects can be integrated early in
present-day investments, or vice versa. For instance, once a city has developed on both
sides of the river it has become almost impossible to substantially widen the riverbed in te
future. This clears one of the best options for adapting to river ﬂooding; toggling between
time-horizons puts this long-term problem of a present-day viable policy option into the
discussion.Moreover, it also proposes new solutions and integrates these into the cost-beneﬁt
analysis and planning process. For example, in the case of city of Nijmegen, a large-scale river
bypass was implemented well before climate change would require it. Doing this now, long
before actually needed, turned out to be the most eﬀective way for preventing river-ﬂooding
in the future. The new analytical tools made it a viable option, where the ‘normal’models for
planning would not have favored this option.
Lesson 4: long-term options as political anchors
The Delta Program attempts to preserve favorable conditions for interventions that may be
needed in the future; it wants to keep possible routes toward possible futures open. As part of
the Delta Decisions and regional strategies, it has been decided to keep these long-term
options open. Spatial reservations for possible future river bypasses and retention areas are
one important consequence of that decision. Without the program these options would not
have been a serious and viable option in the debate; because of the instruments for planning
were reset in integral terms these options became logical steps in the policy design process.
Operational ⇔ political capacity
Lesson 5: take the debate ‘out of every-day politics’
Adaptation requires a setting that allows agencies and publicmanagers to distance themselves
from day-to-day issues. This conditionwas provided by the institutional recommendations of
‘the founding fathers’ of the Delta Program, the Second Delta Commission. That
Commission existed just for a year. However, their fairly radical recommendations were
widely embraced and implemented. The advice of the Commission was to move the issue of
ﬂood safety beyond the scope of the day-to-day political debate. To do so, the Commission
proposed a threefold institutional structure; a Delta Fund with a sizeable annual budget of 1
billion euros, aDelta Commissioner to eﬀectively direct the policy formulation and implanta-
tion, and a Delta Act to provide the legal structure for climate adaptation. This structure was
deliberately designed to break away from day-to-day politics and pressure on the annual
budget in Parliament; at the same time political accountability was organized by an annual
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report on advancements and plans that is presented to parliament on the annual Day of the
Budget.
This laid the basis for eﬀectively dealing with the climate change issue over a long period of
time and provided the stability needed to systematically and continuously anticipate possible
future and engage in policy discussion with the many levels of government involved. The
exact strategies for addressing the challenges related to the changing climate will be adapted
and developed further, but the basis for long-term adaptation policy is ﬁrmly laid (Van Der
Steen et al., 2016).
Lesson 6: strengthen the linkages between decentralized and centralized decision-
making
The institutional landscape for water policy is highly decentralized and dispersed. Many
diﬀerent stakeholders, with very diﬀerent interests, are needed to formulate and implement
policies. The Delta Commissioner seems to be a central ﬁgure that can force agreement, or
override regional or sectoral resistance, but that is hardly a practical option; there is simply
too much space for actors to move around centralized power or to frustrate policy at length.
That is why the Delta Commissioner drew up a timeline of four years to iteratively develop
generic national policy frameworks and regional strategies; thus, maximizing the design space
of local actors to ﬁnd agreement on regional strategies. Civil servants from all government
levels participated in the regional processes.
Moreover, the Delta Commissioner at times used his personal authority and charisma to
push the process in a certain direction and to ‘help’ local actors to overcome barriers. Adding
to his potential to resolve barriers in decision-making is the fact that the Delta Commissioner
is appointed for seven years; on average two to three times as long as the average national
government. The Delta Commissioner is a continuous factor in the decision-making process.
This top-down–bottom-up nature of the process also helped in overcoming possible imple-
mentation-gaps; regional stakeholders feel ownership over ‘their’ adaptation strategies and are
committed to implementing them. The central Delta Commissioner can resort to a role of
overseeing and if necessary helping local stakeholders to execute the regional strategy.
Figure 1 visualizes the design choices and their relations with the interplays between
the policy competencies
Conclusion
In this article, we have examined the formulation and implementation of a policy
design that attempts to anticipate uncertain future developments and feedbacks, to
answer our central research question:
What are the design characteristics of policy capacity building for anticipating future
eﬀectiveness amidst deep uncertainty?
The case of climate adaptation is an extreme case with conditions of deep uncertainty
and complexity, a long-time horizon with a long lead-time of interventions, and the
problem of discounting eﬀects that are spread-out over a long period. The case
illustrates that eﬀective interplay between the three distinguished policy capacities is
important, and requires speciﬁc design choices, synthesized in Figure 1. This synthesis
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provides us with an adapted policy capacity framework that can be used to categorize
design choices and analyze the eﬀectiveness of interplays, or the lack thereof.
In the case of the Delta program, we located the largest challenges in the interplay
between operational capacity and analytical capacity. This application of the framework
helps identify ‘weak links’ and the processes – and subsequently focusing energy for
improving them. We also used the case analysis to specify which policy design elements
of the respective capacities contribute most to the chance of success. These elements
contribute to the theoretical concept of designing policy capacity that anticipates
success under conditions of deep uncertainty, policy myopia and complexity.
Operational capacity: A systematic investment in generating and sharing information at
all levels. The Delta program and the Delta Commissioner explicitly focus on a long-term
problem and look at long-term conditions. The program starts from the initial assumption
that it is impossible to ‘know’ the future, but that it is crucial to make ‘informed policy’.
That is why the Delta program invests heavily in analysis of the body of climate research,
but also invested in collecting a variety of perspectives to look at the issue of climate
adaptation. The crucial policy-choice was to not build a program on one plausible future, or
to aim for one preferable scenario, but to take into account all plausible scenarios; the
Program has designed policy pathways that are ﬁt for a variety of scenarios and works on
establishing triggers and signposts that signal the manifestation of a certain scenario.
Moreover, decisions to invest in water works are also made with close attention for the
consequences for future developments; do certain investments close-of or enhance future
options, can an investment now be of value for a future option and is it possible to link
current issues to investments that need to be done in the future anyhow?
Analytical capacity: An integration of adaptivity in operational structures for policy: eg
‘Adaptive Delta Management’, ‘adaptive by design’ and ‘adaptation pathways’; The Delta
program and the institutional composition of its stakeholders and operating procedures
are ‘adaptive by design’. The assumption behind the program is that circumstances will
change and that everything that is built now will have to be ﬁt for use under diﬀerent
Figure 1. Situations of deep uncertainty require intense interplay between policy capacities.
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conditions. That is an issue in the design of structures – such as waterways or water-
works – but also in the institutional design of the Program. Embedded is a collective
agreement on (and concrete procedures for) what needs to happen if external changes
necessitate a change of direction, and when stakeholders agree to disagree, a unique
feature of the Delta Program design. The Program is ‘built-to-last’, but by the means of
the possibility of continuous adaptation.
Political capacity: Alignment of analytical, operational, and political capacity; decen-
tralized and centralized decision-making dynamics: The Delta program is mindful of
common tensions and disparities between various levels and actors in multi-level
governance settings (cf. Hooghe and Marks, 2003). It is a national program, uniting
all levels of government and closely cooperating with knowledge institutes, NGOs and
the private sector. The program is managed by the Delta Commissioner, which might
give the impression of a centralized, top-down led program. However, most of the work
needs to be done by decentralized governments with and in local and regional networks
of stakeholders. The Delta Commissioner has little formal power and is reliant on local
partners – but is very inﬂuential. The Delta Commissioner has developed a governance-
style that takes local dynamics into account and produces ‘ﬁrm’ decisions that are
carried by regional networks, and for which local stakeholders feel ownership.
Clearly, our contours of successful policy design require additional comparative
research, including more cases and policy domains. In our article, we presented a single
case study from the Netherlands, with very limited generalizability. However, our basic
analysis produces intriguing questions for comparative case study research into key
commonalities between how countries organize their capacity and design, and how they
either succeed or fail in doing so.
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